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Neomercantilism and Great-Power
Energy Competition in Central Asia
and the Caspian
Charles E. Ziegler
Rajan Menon
Russia, China, and the United States are vying for political influence
and control of natural resources in Central Asia in what has been labeled
a twenty-first-century Great Game.1 Among the conditions drawing
these major powers to the region are its location at the heart of the Eurasian landmass and its bountiful natural resources. China and Russia
are driven in roughly equal measure by political and economic considerations. They have adopted neomercantilist policies (i.e., state-directed
efforts aimed at making asymmetric economic gains at the expense of
competitors, a concept we discuss at length below) to realize their goals
in the region. The neomercantilist energy policies of China and Russia
contribute to what is largely a competitive relationship among all three
great powers in Central Asia. While neomercantilist policies do not
negate the possibility of cooperation and the development of norms,
rules, and institutions designed to promote collective action, they
certainly erect formidable barriers.
We argue that illiberal states such as Russia and China that selectively
accept elements of capitalism and the market economy, operate in illiberal
environments (Central Asia), and compete for vital commodities (oil
and gas), will adopt neomercantilism as opposed to policies based on
liberal assumptions and expectations. The institutional legacy of central
Charles E. Ziegler, is a Distinguished University Scholar and professor of political science at the University
of Louisville. He authored The History of Russia (Greenwood, 1999), Foreign Policy and East Asia
(Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Environmental Policy in the USSR (University of Massachusetts
Press, 1987). Ziegler’s latest book is Civil Society and Politics in Central Asia (University Press of Kentucky,
2014.) He has written more than 70 book chapters and articles for such journals as Comparative Politics,
Political Science Quarterly, and British Journal of Political Science.
Rajan Menon holds the Anne and Bernard Spitzer chair in political science at the Colin Powell
School, City College of New York/City University of New York, and is a nonresident senior fellow at the
Atlantic Council. He has taught at Columbia and Vanderbilt Universities and has served as special
assistant for arms control and national security to Cong. Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) while an international
affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, of which he is a member.
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014

[ 17 ]

Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon

planning shared by China and Russia (and the Central Asian states)
creates a path dependence that differentiates the patterns of interaction
between firms and the state from those found in long-standing liberal
economies and polities. True, even liberal states may resort to neomercantilist strategies when it comes to hydrocarbons.2 But illiberal
states more readily jettison liberal practices, not least because they already
have scant ideological commitment to them.
Russia and China have pursued neomercantilist strategies in Central
Asia with varying degrees of success. By contrast, the United States has
in the main adopted a liberal approach, while supporting the business
interests of US energy corporations. This article assesses the success and
limits of the Chinese and Russian neomercantilist strategies in Central
Asia, advancing three broad hypotheses about major-power behavior in
energy-rich regions. First: great powers with statist traditions will use
state-owned or state-controlled firms to secure vital supplies of energy.
Neomercantilist great powers will exercise state control in tandem with
market processes when it comes to securing energy resources, not least
because of the vital role of hydrocarbons in national security.
The second hypothesis is that security considerations will impel great
powers to assert state control over upstream assets whenever possible. To
this end, they will seek maximum control over pipeline routes and take
steps to reduce their vulnerability to supply disruptions created by competitors and efforts by rivals to create export channels that circumvent
their territories. The logic here is that the market is perceived as not sufficiently reliable to ensure regular supplies of energy at reasonable prices,
which in turn are essential to national security and the state’s relative
power. Thus we should expect major powers to use the state to control
both supply routes, and supplies themselves, to the greatest extent possible and to act on the assumption that, in economic policy, there is a
national interest and its best and rightful custodian is the state rather
than freewheeling private actors or market forces.3
Our final hypothesis is that major powers’ preoccupation with relative
gains will lead them to approach hydrocarbons in zero-sum, competitive
terms, notwithstanding the technical and financial pressures toward cooperation in a complex industry and even in the face of strictly economic
reasons to eschew mercantilist policies. In a word, politics and national
security strongly influence economic decisions. Neomercantilism predicts
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that states will act on this zero-sum logic in the struggle for resources,
resulting in major power interactions marked primarily by competition.

The Neomercantilist Paradigm
Neomercantilism, as we are using the term, is a form of economic
nationalism. It does not reject the market. Instead, it seeks to protect
state interests, particularly the political and military standing of a country,
by trying to shape the national and international workings of markets.
Its aim is to bend markets to suit national objectives or, failing that,
to reject efficiency and short-term-profit-driven market calculations in
favor of those seen to advance national power. To this end, neomercantilist states seek to control the “commanding heights” of the economy, the
largest and most strategic sectors, through wholly state-owned firms or
ones that in effect act as agents of the state and are supported by it in
various ways. States try to ensure the business interests of major firms
dovetail closely with official policies while realizing the higher growth
rates and efficiencies enjoyed by publicly traded firms in the global market.4
The state augments its power, while firms acquire monopoly (or oligopoly) rights from the state, ensuring their ability to extract rents.
Neomercantilism starts from the same point as neorealism.5 It assumes that the anarchic international order drives states toward competition and maximizing relative power to preserve their sovereignty and
security and, within the context of these supervening imperatives, to
pursue the goals that flow from their specific internal and external circumstances. Moreover, neomercantilism seeks to explain how states will
craft economic policies to maximize wealth as a part of their effort to
increase their standing in the international system. They use the governmental apparatus to try to overcome, or at least limit, market outcomes
that could constrain the development of critical firms—those deemed
pivotal to the state’s power—and to gain privileged access to essential
raw materials and markets. Neomercantilism also assumes that states
seek to control foreign investments and other financial flows and limit
vulnerability to external economic constraints—even when, in terms of
the logic of neoclassical economic principles, such choices may not produce the most efficient outcomes.
While contemporary neomercantilism differs significantly from its
classical antecedent, one striking commonality is the effort by states
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
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to maximize national wealth by securing and using vital raw materials.
Gold and silver were the strategic commodities for the early modern
nation-state; oil and natural gas fulfill this role today. Self-sufficiency in
natural resources confers a major advantage to states, but of the three
major powers involved in Central Asia, only Russia is self-sufficient in oil
and gas.6 For great powers lacking adequate supplies of energy, control
over transit routes becomes vitally important, for both security and prosperity. Neomercantilist theory takes explicit account of how geography—and
for the purposes of this analysis, trade routes and resource locations in
particular—shapes a state’s calculations concerning economic competition.7
Neomercantilism accepts liberalism’s stress on the importance of productive capacity for firms and bureaucracies, but it offers a very different
view of the appropriate relationship between states and markets. It is
skeptical of liberalism’s assumption that self-interested individual consumers or firms will necessarily maximize the wealth of nations. Instead,
it assumes state guidance, even state ownership of firms, in whole or
part, is essential to ensure the behavior of individuals and firms is consonant with the national interest defined as the country’s relative standing. State control over the economy is deemed an appropriate, indeed
essential, strategy to achieve the supreme end of maximizing a country’s
power in relation to its competitors and to reducing the vulnerabilities
that accompany integration into the global economy. In contrast to the
variable-sum logic of liberalism, neomercantilism rests on the zero-sum
premise that, as self-interested actors driven by their bottom lines, domestic firms may act in ways contrary to the interests of the home state,
and foreign firms and other countries will do so to an even greater extent. If liberalism avers that global economic competition and the flow of
trade and finance should be as unfettered as possible, neomercantilism is
wary of unregulated markets and interdependence which may diminish
national prosperity and security of rising powers while working to the
natural advantage of countries that are already wealthy and powerful.
Energy is critical for great powers determined to ensure national security and maximize economic wealth. Its importance has grown as the
prosperity and security of an increasing number of states are tied to
securing supplies at predictable prices while the number of states that
consume large amounts of energy has increased. Major oil exporters,
for their part, are fiercely protective of their sovereignty and either limit
foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector or nationalize their petro-

[ 20 ]

Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014

Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian

chemical industries in whole or in part. They see energy as simultaneously a source of wealth and political leverage. The result is that even
those states that pledge fealty to liberal economic principles regularly
disregard market mechanisms in the interest of preserving national
security. No state renounces neomercantilist strategies; what differentiates states is the degree and regularity with which they use them and the
extent to which neomercantilism is embodied in their ideology.
What matters for neomercantilists is the state’s military or economic
power relative to competitors, and that requires governments to be active
in promoting trade, shaping investment policy, and supporting national
firms. Of course, if all states were to behave this way and there were no
institutional arrangements in place to manage the competition, states
would threaten one another’s security by, for example, building preferential trading blocs, manipulating currencies, discriminating against
foreign companies, subsidizing national firms, and locking up sources of
raw materials. The pervasiveness of such a strategy in the international
system would increase the likelihood for crises, even conflicts.8 Neomercantilism is skeptical of institutional mechanisms designed to foster
cooperation because it assumes such structures themselves are captured
by powerful states to advance their relative position.

Neomercantilist Strategies and Central Asia
Because oil and natural gas are vital commodities for national security,
there is a natural tendency for states, particularly those with weak commitments to liberalism, to adopt and utilize neomercantilist energy
policies. But oil and gas are governed by distinctly different markets.
Oil in recent years has traded on a genuinely global market, with prices
set by supply and demand and the bulk of supplies delivered by tanker.
Oil is highly fungible. By contrast, natural gas is not a global commodity; it is traded on regional markets and is usually delivered by pipeline
(with some traded in liquefied form via tanker). Long-term contracts
are concluded between suppliers and consumers, with prices indexed to
substitute fuels, generally oil. With the natural gas fracking revolution
and the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and spot trading, the
gas market is beginning to change, but the fixed, interdependent nature
of the present gas infrastructure makes these energy relationships more
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
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susceptible to politics, as in the EU-Russia gas trade or the ChineseRussian gas pipeline negotiations.
The point is, trade in both commodities is still heavily shaped by
geography (in addition to technology). Given Central Asia’s landlocked
status, the geopolitical dimension of trade in both commodities is
reflected in the strategies of the interested major powers operating in the
region. The United States seeks to limit Russia’s influence, Moscow attempts to preserve its monopoly over export routes, and China pursues
its strategic interest in diversifying supply networks.
The United States and China, respectively the world’s largest and
second-largest consumers of oil, are competing for secure supplies. Russia,
by contrast, is a net energy exporter and in 2012 was the world’s third
largest producer of crude oil, accounting for 10.4 million barrels per
day (bpd), nearly 12 percent of world production.9 Central Asia provides an alternative to potentially unstable suppliers in the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America. While the region’s reserves cannot compare
with those of the Middle East, it does have approximately 3 percent of
the world’s proven reserves of oil and roughly 4 percent of natural gas
reserves. In 2012, the Caspian Sea region (which included Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Russia) produced about 2.6 million barrels of crude oil per day and about 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.10
Moreover, Central Asia’s crude oil and natural gas output could increase
significantly over the next decade.
The three major powers have competing interests in the region when
it comes to energy. The United States, the world’s largest importer of
crude oil, has made tapping the Caspian oil and gas reserves one of its
three priorities in the region (the other two being promoting democracy
and enhancing security and stability by countering terrorism, weapons
proliferation, and narcotics trafficking).11 Various US companies are
involved in oil and gas production in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
primarily in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and while Washington generally supports a more market-based approach to energy than do China or
Russia, the United States has employed a mix of diplomatic and political
levers to influence transit routes and facilitate Western access to Central
Asia’s oil and gas reserves. Washington’s strategy has been to deny Russia
a monopoly over oil and gas exports from Central Asia by promoting
alternate export routes, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline,
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and the now-canceled Nabucco
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gas route. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), slated to transport 20 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe, will run from Azerbaijan through
Greece and Albania and thence under the Adriatic to Italy. Selection of
the TAP by the Shah Deniz consortium effectively ends the Nabucco
concept.12 Moscow sees these efforts of Washington and the EU as an
attempt to erode, even supplant, Russia’s long-established dominance in
these regions.
Russia’s Neomercantilist Strategies
Central Asia occupies a pivotal position in Russia’s political and energy
calculations because of the centrality of energy transportation and sales
for the Russian economy.13 Although part of Russia’s petrochemical industry is privately owned (most notably LUKoil and TNK-BP), the state
is prominently represented by three “national champions”—Gazprom in
natural gas production and supply, Rosneft in oil production, and Transneft, the state pipeline construction firm. Early in Vladimir Putin’s first
term as president, these mammoth state firms were given primary responsibility for restoring Russia’s economic and geostrategic position.14
Russian energy oligarchs who agreed to support Putin’s state-building
plan were allowed to retain their private empires, while those seen as
impediments (Mikhail Khodorkovsky is the most prominent example)
were jailed or exiled.
Russia’s determination to control transit routes in Central Asia, maximize political control over the region, preserve its strong position as
energy exporter to Europe, and enhance state revenues is emblematic of
the neomercantilist approach. The remnants of Soviet-era energy infrastructure, together with geopolitical constraints to the south (economic
sanctions on Iran), force Central Asians to rely heavily on their northern
neighbor for energy exports. Russia’s state-owned energy companies
realize substantial revenues from transit fees and reselling gas in the European market.15 Moscow has taken advantage of its position to extract
rents from Central Asia, whether through reshipment of natural gas to
Europe or oil piped through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) or
Atyrau-Samara-Novorossiisk lines. Until the mid 2000s, Gazprom had
monopolized Turkmenistan’s export options for natural gas because the
firm owned the pipeline networks the Turkmen government relied on to
export its gas. This advantage, in part a relic of the Soviet era, enabled
Russia to buy the bulk of Turkmenistan’s gas output. This strategy in
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014

[ 23 ]

Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon

turn strengthened Russia’s ability to increase Europe’s dependence on
gas supplies from Russia, which already amounts to one-third of its total
consumption. However, the completion of Turkmenistan’s gas pipeline
to China (in 2009), and Europe’s stagnant demand for natural gas since
the Great Recession, have reduced Moscow’s leverage. China has become a major importer of Turkmen gas and has invested substantially in
Turkmenistan’s gas fields and in pipelines headed from there to China.
Russia is an original partner in the CPC, and state-owned Transneft
now holds a 31 percent stake in the consortium. The Russian government has sought additional advantages for itself through tariffs, corporate governance, and managerial control. The CPC has been operating
at capacity and has for years been planning a second stage expansion
that would nearly double throughput. Until 2008, however, Russia
had blocked the consortium’s efforts to expand deliveries, demanding
changes in tariff and interest rates and introducing “take or pay” clauses
tied to expanded deliveries.16 Moscow’s demands, which seemed based
more on political considerations than purely economic rationale, were
an attempt to pressure the other consortium members to improve Russia’s
position within the CPC. Once Transneft acquired control of the pipeline in 2007, the Russian authorities reversed their position and became
vocal supporters of expanding the CPC’s capacity, particularly for transporting oil from Kazakhstan’s giant Kashagan field, estimated to hold 38
billion barrels of oil. Russia hopes in this instance hinge on the problems
Kashagan has faced in terms of delay and massive cost overruns, which
rose by a factor of two from the original estimate to reach $38 billion.17
Moscow has also sought to block US and European plans to ship
Central Asia’s natural gas across the Caspian Sea— bypassing Gazprom’s
monopoly position—by citing environmental hazards. The prospects
for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCP) from Turkmenbashi to Azerbaijan’s Sangachal terminal are murky for two other reasons. First is the unresolved legal status of the sea now that the significance of the IranRussia Treaty of 1921 has been rendered obsolete with the emergence
of three post-Soviet states on the shore: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan. Second is the failure of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to
settle their overlapping claims in the Caspian. Though the TCP is but a
distant possibility, Russia has nevertheless registered its objection to it,
arguing that the project is a matter for the coastal states to agree on and
not for the West to push absent a Caspian consensus.18 Russia’s 2007
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deal with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to adopt the Prikaspiskii route
through Russia was widely viewed as a defeat for Western-backed plans
for a trans-Caspian pipeline. However, both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have resisted Moscow’s efforts to control supply routes, demonstrating their intentions to keep their options open by supplying the
Western-backed TCP (in the event it is built) and by exporting energy
to China via pipelines that skirt Russia.
This has made Moscow all the more determined to render Nabucco
economically nonviable. Its chosen instrument toward this end is the
$45 billion South Stream project, which would deliver gas to southern
Europe through a pipeline crossing the Black Sea from Russia.19 While
Russia’s natural gas production is declining and even its long-term purchase agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are
likely to leave the project short of the volume it needs to be commercially viable, Moscow appears no less determined to pursue it. Gazprom’s monopolistic stance on South Stream clashes with provisions of
the EU’s Third Energy Package, which mandates unbundling energy
transportation from production and sales. Russia’s neomercantilist approach to energy relations with Europe has fueled mistrust among many
EU states, especially the newer East European members.20
Like the Nordstream pipeline project, which will carry Russian gas to
Europe via the Baltic Sea, South Stream attests to the Kremlin’s realization that the question of who supplies gas to whom and through which
pipelines is much more than simply a matter of economics. Important
strategic considerations are involved, of which three are particularly important.21 One is enhancing Russia’s leverage over Europe, which will
increase should Europe’s energy supply diversification strategy fail. A
second is greater Russian influence over Central Asia, where China is
making inroads and could eventually displace Russia as the dominant
power in the region. Central Asia’s dependence on Russia is bound to increase if the volume of its gas exports flowing through Russian pipelines
increases; conversely, its autonomy will be enhanced as new pipelines
bypassing Russia go online. Moscow recognizes this possibility and is
energetically seeking to retain and expand its influence through the Customs Union. A third goal is reducing Russia’s dependence on Ukraine,
which now serves as a key conduit for its gas exports to Europe. The
Ukrainian transit issue is critical to Moscow with Victor Yanukovych’s
government ousted and the country’s future orientation uncertain.
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
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Neomercantilism also shapes Russia’s policies toward foreign investment in its energy sector. The need to secure capital and state-of-the-art
technology should push Russia to open its hydrocarbon sector to Western and other international oil firms, not least because domestic oil and
gas production have been stagnant for lack of investment and because
existing oil sources (“old oil”) are being depleted. However, the trend
has been in the opposite direction, as oil prices spiked in the 2000s and
the Kremlin decided to establish domestic control of oil and gas through
state-controlled “national champions.” Using the threat of massive
penalties for environmental violations, it forced Shell and its Japanese
partners in the Sakhalin II venture to transfer controlling ownership to
Gazprom in late 2006. Transneft acquired ownership of the CPC pipeline in 2007, cementing its virtual monopoly of Russian oil pipelines,
while state-owned Rosneft acquired BP’s interest in TNK-BP in 2013
after years of official harassment over supposed environmental and
tax issues.22
The same pattern is apparent in the natural gas sector. State-owned
Gazprom, for example, did not have the technology or the capital to
develop the giant Shtokman natural gas field in the forbidding Barents
Sea, so it contracted with Norway’s Statoil and France’s Total to join it as
minority partners. Gazprom holds a 51 percent share in the project and
is sole owner of the production license and the reserves. The plan was that
after phase one was completed, Statoil and Total would be obligated to
transfer their company shares to Gazprom.23 The US and Canadian shale
gas breakthroughs, however, called into question this expensive and complicated project, negating a key element of Moscow’s energy strategy.24
What counts in the new Russian order is power maximization by the
state, and ensuring national control of energy and other natural resources
is seen as an essential means to that end. Putin’s overriding objectives
include rebuilding a strong centralized state, ensuring and increasing
Russia’s status as a great power, developing a robust Russian nationalism
capable of unifying the country, maintaining a sphere of influence in as
many of the post-Soviet states as possible, and establishing state control
over important branches of the economy. Those sectors of the economy
related to energy and raw materials are vital to this project, so controlling them through direct ownership or regulatory authority, or more
informal mechanisms, is a Kremlin priority. Energy is the regime’s most
valuable instrument to realize Russia’s foreign policy and national security
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goals. The program for establishing state control over national energy
resources and infrastructure has proved popular. A Levada Center poll
conducted in June 2006 found that fully 85 percent of respondents
favored the renationalization of Russia’s oil and gas industries, with only
7 percent opposed.25 As nationalism surged and advocates of restoring
Russia’s great-power status gained in popularity, the notion of an
economy free from state intervention lost adherents.
China’s Neomercantilist Strategies
The crucial role of oil in enabling China to maintain its breakneck
pace of economic growth and its increasing reliance on foreign sources
have made obtaining oil and gas from Central Asia a major element in
Beijing’s energy strategy. Middle Eastern and African oil are more important than Central Asian in China’s calculus (about 50 percent of its
petroleum imports come from the Middle East and 30 percent from
Africa), but the bulk of this oil transits vulnerable sea routes, so alternatives that can be supplied by pipeline confer greater security. Kazakh,
Turkmen, and Russian energy transported by pipeline bypasses the Strait
of Malacca choke point, making them especially attractive suppliers in
Beijing’s eyes.
Although China has embraced market mechanisms for much of its
economy and has joined liberal trading regimes such as the WTO, it continues to pursue a form of neomercantilist energy policy.26 Three stateowned companies—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC),
the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—dominate China’s energy
sector. These national oil companies (NOC) as national champions were
tasked with the political goal of strengthening China’s economic security
by securing upstream assets and diversifying supplies. Since the legislation governing China’s energy sector changed in the early 1990s, the
NOCs have been encouraged to acquire energy assets abroad and to
form partnerships with non-Chinese firms. Their ability to draw oil and
gas to China has been strengthened by the reform of domestic energy prices
and permission to list subsidiaries on foreign exchanges, both steps intended to provide the funds needed to fulfill their mandate.27
As part of the mandate, starting in 1997 the three big Chinese state
oil companies (later joined by smaller firms) moved in force into Central
Asia, buying stakes in major oil fields and state-owned oil companies
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
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in Kazakhstan and completing construction of the 1,348-mile AktyubinskAlashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China in 2008 and the
1,240-mile gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan in 2009. These state-backed moves have pitted China not
only against Western firms, but also against those from Russia, notwithstanding the Russia-China “strategic partnership” and its Central
Asia embodiment, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.28 For both
countries, but especially Turkmenistan whose gas exports were dominated by Gazprom, the China connection has reduced their dependence
on Russia.
China’s energy policy is crafted, monitored, and supported through
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which
is overseen by the State Council. The National Energy Administration
(together with the NDRC) sets domestic wholesale prices, approves new
energy projects, and implements the government’s energy policies. The
Chinese government provides diplomatic support and financial assistance to its oil companies and expects their investments and operations
to support the state goal of energy security. However, bureaucratic fragmentation in the energy sector weakens the state’s ability to direct Chinese
NOCs toward supporting central political goals and contributes to
greater competition between NOCs operating overseas.29
Although state involvement in China’s oil sector more closely resembles a
neomercantilist than a purely liberal approach, the extent of state dominance should not be overstated and is markedly less pronounced than
in Russia. This is especially so in the case of foreign investment in the
domestic energy sector: although Beijing sets guidelines, which among
other things ensure that foreign firms form partnerships with stateowned companies, it has enacted reforms that have made for a notably
more predictable and hospitable environment for international energy
companies than obtainable in Russia. As a result, Chinese oil firms have
in recent years become key advocates of overseas investment, acquiring equity stakes throughout Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America.30
Moreover, China’s NOCs have developed strong corporate interests—
maximizing profits, satisfying shareholders, enlarging market share—
that frequently set them at odds with their fellow NOCs and, sometimes, with the priorities of the central government in Beijing. China’s
leaders, in contrast to their Russian counterparts, appear cognizant of
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the limitations of neomercantilism and have gradually moderated state
control of NOCs.
China’s reform process has been more gradual than Russia’s and
evolved from an initial policy of a strong role for the state toward greater
autonomy for state-owned firms. China has assiduously sought to avoid
Russian-style political fragmentation while proceeding with liberal economic reforms. In both domestic and international contexts, Beijing’s
leaders use the power of market forces while seeking to preserve centralized state control, particularly over strategic commodities like oil and
gas. Specifically, one component of China’s “going out” strategy involved state encouragement and assistance to national oil companies in
acquiring upstream energy assets (often above market prices), with the
expectation of improved long-term security from directly controlling
oil and gas properties. This policy is most notable in Kazakhstan, where
Chinese firms (CNPC and Sinopec) have acquired—either outright or
in the form of substantial shares—energy assets in the Kashagan, North
Buzachi, and Aktobe fields, competing aggressively and with state guidance against foreign firms.31
Such neomercantilist policies are designed to ensure an uninterrupted
flow of hydrocarbons, with the added advantage of having a source of
supply that runs overland and is thus less susceptible to disruption than
China’s other energy imports that move through long sea lanes from
Africa and the Middle East. Oil and gas piped directly from Central
Asia are key components of China’s efforts to maintain high growth rates
and preserve social stability—without relying solely on laissez-faire market
forces to supply energy needs. By contrast, most overseas Chinese equity
oil projects—in Africa, for example—produce oil that is sold on the
global market rather than shipped to Chinese ports.
National energy companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft,
CNPC, CNOOC, and Sinopec are powerful economic entities but also
serve as foreign policy instruments of their respective states, precisely
because they are not fully private actors. While NOCs vary considerably
in their autonomy, they all need to balance the economic demands of
the international market with the political needs of their governments.
For Russia, its hydrocarbon exports, the size and reach of its energy
firms, and its control of key pipelines serve as major sources of national
power, substituting in part for the international influence Moscow lost
when the Soviet Union disintegrated. For China, government-corporate
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014
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partnerships help secure energy supplies, which, in turn, are crucial for
maintaining the country’s breakneck pace of economic growth, enabling
the Communist Party to present itself to Chinese citizens as a competent
custodian and continuing China’s ascent as a front-rank global power.
Chinese officials have been explicit about the link between energy
and security. For example, when the 960-kilometer pipeline connecting
Atasu in Kazakhstan to the Alatau Pass in Xinjiang was opened in May
2006, the deputy general manager of the China Petroleum Exploration
and Development Company observed that the new line would reduce
China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent
of China’s oil imports had been flowing.32 This degree of dependence
on seaborne energy constitutes a major liability on the security front
because it enables the US Navy, which is far superior to its Chinese
counterpart, to disrupt the lifeblood of China’s economy. This explains
Beijing’s efforts to cultivate Russia as another major overland energy
supplier as well as its increasing determination to improve its naval
capabilities.33 With completion of phase one of the East Siberian Pacific
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, Russia was exporting 300,000 bpd of crude to
China by late 2013, and plans call for doubling this amount by 2015.34
Beijing will likely increase efforts to secure reliable, long-term sources
for oil, to diversify the sources of supply, and to prevent adversaries from
disrupting supplies. China’s rapid economic growth and increasing affluence will surely deepen its reliance on imported oil, which is expected
to increase from 50 percent of total consumption in 2008 to 79 percent
by 2030.35
Neomercantilism in Russia and China is part of an overall determination to counter US hegemony which is linked to an ideology advocating unfettered markets for privately owned international oil companies. National oil companies are generally larger and more powerful
than international oil majors, and NOCs confer on the state significant
international influence. However, Chinese and Russian oil companies
are relatively late to the game, and many of the most lucrative properties are already controlled by national oil companies in oil producing
states or by the oil majors. To be effective as state-supported actors in
the global economy, NOCs must be modern, efficient, and competitive
with other national and international energy firms. Chinese officials realize this and have allowed their NOCs greater independence in raising
capital and pursuing overseas acquisitions. But with greater autonomy,
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the NOCs’ interests—particularly their pursuit of profitability—have
often diverged from state goals. Efforts to exert greater state control over
oil and gas firms, as with Gazprom, may harmonize state-NOC interests
to some degree, but with clear tradeoffs in terms of declining competitiveness and profitability. Thus neomercantilist strategies embody contradictory impulses that may not be reconcilable.
Russian and Chinese neomercantilist strategies to penetrate and control the Central Asian energy market have cast this great-power energy
relationship in basically competitive, zero-sum terms, despite assertions
of a “strategic partnership” from both Moscow and Beijing. This energy
competition has impacted security cooperation and multilateral institution building in the Central Asian region.

Energy Security and Great-Power
Competition in Central Asia
Russian and Chinese approaches to Central Asia and to the world
more broadly incorporate contradictory elements. On the one hand,
both countries suspect the US-dominated liberal economic order places
them at a disadvantage and exposes them to social and economic instabilities. Indeed, they frequently point out that the United States itself
violates its professed principles of free trade and open markets when the
system works against US national interests. On the other hand, Russia
and China view international trade and security regimes as having some
utility, even if they are (as in the case of the World Trade Organization) dominated by the US hegemon. However, regional organizations
like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Central Asian
Regional Economic Cooperation program (CEREC), and the Eurasian
Economic Community (EurAsEc) seem to be preferred by Beijing and
Moscow, since they are relatively weak and do not preclude bilateral
security or trading arrangements.
While regional organizations have become more prominent, there is
still no viable trading regime in Central Asia. International cooperation is difficult to achieve in the absence of a hegemon committed to
establishing a stable order. But the question for Beijing and Moscow is
who the hegemon will be; neither China nor Russia is content to have
the United States set and police the rules of the game because, in classic
neomercantilist spirit, they are convinced Washington will play this role
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to advance its relative standing and not act in the interest of all. Russian
and Chinese neomercantilist strategies, in effect, promote a regionalism
that enables them to resolve conflicts and promote stability while resisting the presence of the global hegemon.36
Although Russia provides one-quarter to one-third of Central Asia’s
imports and absorbs 10–20 percent of the region’s exports, its privileged
position in the region is in danger of being eroded. China’s economic
presence is increasing rapidly; more importantly, the China-Russia economic relationship in Central Asia is basically competitive and will become more so. This competition is already evident as Moscow promotes
its Customs Union as a trading bloc, while China maneuvers to position
the SCO as its preferred economic regime. In this environment, powerful state-controlled energy firms (and indeed non-energy state-owned
companies) seek relative gains for their patron states, with the state exercising its power to advance firms’ interests. While the rivalry between
the Russia-China partnership and the West gets the most attention these
days, in the long run the competition in Central Asia will pit Beijing
against Moscow, with both seeking to dominate the sources and transportation networks for Central Asia’s energy.
This is not to suggest an imminent military conflict between Russia and
China in Central Asia. But President Putin’s drive to expand the Customs Union into a broader Eurasian Union comprised of both Central
Asian and European former Soviet republics provides regional elites with
a guarantee against encroachment from powerful neighbors, whether
from the East (China) or West (the EU and NATO).37 Membership in the
Customs Union appeals to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus
not because it will generate substantial economic benefits, but more so
because of the political protection it will afford. In Ukraine’s case, conflicting pressures have splintered the country between those who prefer
Moscow’s design and those who favor a European path. Unease over
China’s growing presence in Central Asia and the absence of such clear
lines of demarcation within these countries suggests that instability there
will likely derive from state weakness and problems of succession rather
than great-power competition.
Neomercantilist energy policies in Central Asia reflect a zero-sum
mentality. Each state seeks to maximize its power and influence unilaterally and through different multilateral organizations—Russia through
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Customs Union, and bilateral
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security treaties with Central Asian states, and China through the Shanghai Treaty Organization and bilateral trade and energy deals. In the
absence of an effective international energy regime for Central Asia, the
major powers jockey for advantage while the smaller energy-rich states
seek to play the giants against each other.
There is considerable congruence among the political and security
goals of Russia and China and those of the regional states in Central
Asia. Russia and China cooperate on security; both seek to limit US
and NATO influence in Central Asia and to constrain US unilateralism
globally. This balancing behavior does not extend to energy resources,
where each competes with the other for access. Russia and China use
their national oil and gas companies to enhance their political influence
in Central Asia and to gain an edge over the other. For example, after
the Russian government’s takeover of Yukos, the proposed oil pipeline
to China was sidelined in favor of a route to the Pacific advocated by
the Japanese. This decision infuriated the Chinese, who were only partly
mollified when Russian officials promised to construct a spur to Daqing. In
response, China redoubled its efforts to conclude energy deals in Central
Asia. The Chinese government has consistently supported its national
oil companies through a broader policy of engagement, including trade
and high-level diplomacy, and by providing assistance for infrastructure
development.
China’s foreign policy, like Russia’s, asserts near-absolute, nineteenthcentury-style sovereignty to shield the country from pernicious foreign
influences.38 China’s “new security concept” posits a foundational role
for Mao’s five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in
the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence. The workings of the SCO and the ASEAN Regional
Forum are held up as examples of the successful implementation of
China’s security concept.39 As in Russia, the Chinese government fears
populism and pluralism, where student, peasant, and religious movements are perceived as undermining the Communist Party’s political
monopoly and jeopardizing domestic stability.
Securing reliable oil and gas supplies is vital to the government’s chief
goal of preserving domestic stability by maintaining high economic
growth rates. The PRC has significant crude oil—about 20.4 billion
barrels proven reserves in 2013—but consumption continues to grow
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rapidly, even in the midst of record prices, and imports constitute an
ever-larger share of China’s needs. While domestic production supplied
55 percent of China’s needs in 2006, this had dropped to 42 percent
by 2013. China’s energy policy calls for maximizing domestic production and developing alternative energy sources, but assuming that
China’s record growth does not slow dramatically, there is no chance
of the country becoming energy self-sufficient. According to the US
Energy Information Administration (EIA), China is poised to surpass
the United States as the world’s largest energy importer in 2014, and
the EIA projects that China will import 72 percent of its oil in 2040.40
Neomercantilism makes a distinctive contribution to our understanding of how the major powers interact in Central Asia. While there is a
good deal of talk about the need to cooperate on energy exploration and
development in Central Asia and the absolute gains to be realized from
diversifying world supplies, Russia and China each seem to be seeking
unilateral advantage in the region. The Central Asian states themselves,
and the secondary powers with interests in the region (Iran, Japan, Korea,
and India), also compete for advantage by using state-owned or stateinfluenced energy companies.
However, neomercantilism cannot provide completely satisfactory
explanations for the dynamics and complexities of Central Asian energy
politics. For example, the technological and financial demands of exploring and developing hydrocarbon reserves in this remote region have
led to unlikely forms of cooperation that would not be predicted by neomercantilism. Examples of international cooperation in the region include the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, efforts to develop Kazakhstan’s
Kashagan field in the North Caspian, and even the Kazakhstan-China
oil pipeline, which regularly transports Russian oil to China. Here, the
national interests of states cannot substitute for the modern technological and infrastructural needs of oil and gas production. Countries that
venture too far down the path of state control risk falling behind.
As the rivalry among states in Central Asia demonstrates, neomercantilism is the dominant mode of competition, and in the wake of the
Great Recession its appeal may be waxing rather than waning. Zero-sum
conceptions are difficult to avoid, and the pressures for state involvement in economies are growing. The appeal of nationalism, including
economic and resource nationalism, has not diminished—if anything,
the commitment to strengthening state sovereignty by seeking privileged

[ 34 ]

Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Summer 2014

Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian

access to markets and resources and by actively supporting national
firms is gaining strength. This trend is likely to increase as the vulnerabilities that citizens and states face in a world of untrammeled markets
are becoming more evident. The failure of neoliberal economics to bring
prosperity to many parts of the former Soviet Union, the bitter reaction
against inequalities produced by neoliberal policies, and the success of
state-guided economic development in China have drawn policymakers
in these countries toward economic nationalist strategies.
Russian-Chinese energy competition in Central Asia does not preclude
bilateral cooperation. In 2013 the two sides signed an $85 billion deal
for Rosneft to deliver some 100 million tons of oil per year to Sinopec
through the expanded ESPO, while preliminary agreements on LNG
were reached between Yamal LNG and PetroChina International.41 But
in Central Asia the relationship is essentially zero-sum, with China realizing gains at Russia’s expense. For example, Central Asian gas exports
to Russia have allowed Gazprom to cover the domestic Russian market,
leaving sufficient quantities for export to Europe and guaranteeing the
bulk of the company’s revenues. Thus, substantial Chinese imports of
Turkmen natural gas constitute a net loss for Russia’s premier national
champion, Gazprom. Similarly, the 10 million tons per year of Kazakh
oil piped directly to China constitutes a net loss of lucrative transit fees
for state-owned Transneft.
Competition between Russia and China may intensify as Beijing’s
presence in Central Asia grows. On a 2013 trip through Central Asia,
Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed that his country and Central
Asia cooperate to build a “new Silk Road” from the Pacific to the Baltic,
noting the 100-fold increase in trade over the past two decades. Xi also
announced Beijing’s intention to provide funds for 30,000 scholarships
to SCO members and praised the development of political and cultural ties between Central Asia and China.42 The regional geopolitical
balance will continue to shift in China’s favor if Moscow cannot move
beyond rhetoric and heavy-handed pressure to match China’s economic
and demographic power.43
Oil and gas are unique commodities: not only are they critical to
modern economies, their supply—unlike that of many other tradable
items, such as clothes, electronics, or furniture—is exhaustible. Furthermore, increased consumption of oil and gas does not make everyone better
off, as conventional economic theory assumes. If China consumes more
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oil, there is less available for motorists elsewhere, at least at affordable
prices. Consuming more oil and gas may raise individual living standards, but it also generates more pollution and accelerates global warming. The collective action problem of the production and consumption
of hydrocarbons casts the issue in zero-sum terms, which helps explain
the neomercantilist mind-set on energy. By highlighting the problems
of collective action, neomercantilism holds out little hope that international or even regional regimes intended to smooth the edges of resource
competition will succeed, particularly in a world where new centers of
economic power will increase the demand for critical commodities.

Conclusion
The preceding analysis suggests several policy-relevant conclusions.
First, the historic north-south axis that originated in the nineteenthcentury expansion southward of Tsarist Russia and tied Central Asia and
the Caspian states to Russia for some 150 years is being undermined by
competition Moscow faces from Europe, the United States, and China.
Russia will continue to resist this process, as evident from its energy
strategy in these two regions. Great-power cooperation in Central Asia
and the Caspian could mitigate common problems ranging from environmental degradation to curbing extremist and terrorist movements.
Competition over energy will negate much of the incentive for collective
action because energy has a unique strategic dimension, more so because
of the neomercantilist outlook of Moscow and Beijing.
Second, whatever the United States and Europe may profess, Russia
and China do not accept their self-proclaimed fealty to liberal principles.
Both Moscow and Beijing believe US and European energy policies are
in fact designed to undercut Chinese and Russian positions in Central
Asia and the Caspian; this is particularly true of Russia. Thus governmental cooperation on energy security is unlikely, even when opportunities arise.
Third, despite the “strategic partnership” claimed by China and Russia,
it is China, more than the West, that poses the greatest challenge to
Russia’s long-established economic position in Central Asia. And given
Russia’s neomercantilist outlook, it sees the loss of economic influence as
no different from the loss of political influence—indeed the two are now
equated in Kremlin policy. This raises the question: despite the rocky
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state of the US-Russian relationship, will Moscow eventually hedge its
bets and seek a rapprochement with the United States to balance a rising
China which is now challenging its standing in its southern perimeter?
Finally, with the advent of a post-US Afghanistan, the prospect of instability spilling over into Central Asia is no longer a problem primarily
for Russia, the historic hegemon, but for the United States and China
as well, because both are now deeply implicated in the region, in part
because of their quest for energy. The problem is that if the pattern of
great-power interaction revealed by our analysis persists—and there are
sound reasons to conclude it will—the prospects for collective action are
not promising.
The neomercantilist perspective provides significant insights into the
sources of, and strategies used in, major power competition in Central
Asia. Neomercantilism has the advantage of incorporating the economic
facets of great-power competition in a specific and substantial way. Our
analysis has found considerable support for the first hypothesis—that
national interests of statist powers lead them to employ neomercantilist
strategies in the energy sphere. There is also persuasive evidence to support the second and third hypotheses—that security concerns will lead
states to seek control over energy supplies and transit routes, and that
states will tend to behave according to a zero-sum, competitive logic
when it comes to hydrocarbons. However, there are significant differences between the two states. China has in recent years followed a more
flexible neomercantilist policy of granting NOCs greater autonomy,
while Russia has consolidated and extended state control over its larger
energy firms.
Energy competition has had a major impact in shaping great-power
relations in Central Asia. There has indeed been a contest among the
major powers in Central Asia—a new frontier of the post–Cold War
world—and much of the contest has centered on gaining access to the
region’s oil and gas resources. Rather than trust the market, Russia and
China have utilized neomercantilist strategies to achieve their energy
goals in the region. Moscow’s priorities are to maximize access to Central
Asia’s hydrocarbons through its national oil and gas companies, to
monopolize the transit routes for energy, and to maximize government
revenue. Politically, Russia seeks to restore influence lost during the chaotic
1990s, viewing Central Asia as a sphere of privileged interest where it
has the right to limit the presence of competing powers. Moscow is
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willing to cooperate with the other great powers to contain terrorism and instability in Central Asia, but the long-term presence of US
troops in the region and China’s emergence as a great power present
distinct challenges.
China’s energy goals in Central Asia include seeking upstream assets
for its national oil companies and promoting direct supply routes for
oil and gas from the region. Chinese energy investments are part of a
broader process of economic infiltration of the Central Asian economies,
as Chinese consumer goods gradually displace those from Russia.
Beijing’s political and security goals are focused on containing the “three
evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism; preserving regional
stability; and patiently expanding its influence through trade and other
mechanisms of soft power. As a result of its more flexible neomercantilist
policies, China’s influence in Central Asia may be expected to increase
over the long term.
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